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Sovereignty Games, International Law and Politics
tanja aalberts and thomas gammeltoft-hansen
2.1 Introduction
Our starting point for this volume is the interplay of different empirical
developments: the expansion and transformation of international law, on
the one hand, and the response of states in terms of their engagement
with and contestation of international law, on the other. More specifically,
we investigate how the proliferation, fragmentation, constitutionalization
and deformalization of international law impact how states engage with
and resist the rule of law. As the conceptual backdrop to the empirical
starting point and analytical framework set out in Chapter 1, this chapter
outlines the conceptual issues behind these observations and addresses
some of the theoretical questions they raise about our understanding of
the relationship between international law and politics, between rules and
strategy and between legalization and sovereignty.
As alluded to in the previous chapter, the increasing legalization of the
international realm entails not only the quantitative expansion of interna-
tional law into ever more legal regimes but also a qualitative transforma-
tion of international law towards regulating issues like economic develop-
ment, human rights and welfare, and thus increasingly undercutting the
traditional separation of domestic and international affairs.1 This separa-
tion is the backbone of how sovereignty, as a claim to supreme author-
ity over a territory, traditionally operates. Domestic supremacy (internal
sovereignty) is linked to a lack of such overarching authority in the inter-
national realm, where external sovereignty manifests itself in the princi-
ples of sovereign equality and non-intervention and the ability to regulate
1 Other qualitative transformations of international law entail increasing resort to soft law,
managerialism and risk management. See further below and Chapters 6 and 7, this volume.
26
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and order international relations.2 Insofar as these regulative principles
are based on respecting every state’s freedom and autonomy, the expan-
sion of international law and in particular the shift to more substantive
regulation and the international law of cooperation are often seen as an
intrusion of states’ sovereignty and political freedom. As Langford et al.
suggest in Chapter 4, sovereignty appears to be giving way to governance,
and politics to law. Yet, such an analysis, they point out, is built on a tele-
ological perspective on the evolution of international society, which sim-
ply assumes that more international law (i.e. legalization) automatically
constrains state behaviour and reduces power politics. Equally unsatisfy-
ing is the opposite view forwarded by, for example, International Relations
(IR) realists and certain legal scholars that international law has little or no
impact on sovereignty or politics. Neither perspective seems to capture the
dynamics between international law and politics that we observe, as both
these optics share a zero-sumconception of their relationship: either inter-
national law trumps politics (and curtails sovereignty) or politics trumps
international law.
This presentation of international law and politics as mutually exclu-
sive has a long-standing history and lies at the root of the disciplinary
separation of IR from IL. As noted by one of IR’s founding fathers, Hans
Morgenthau, ‘the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political
sphere [and] thinks in terms of interest defined as power . . . the lawyer,
of conformity of action with legal rules’.3 In other words, politics is about
power and strategy, law about rules and norms – and never the twain shall
meet. While various approaches in both IL and IR have sought to analyze
the relationship between politics and law since the 1970s, Morgenthau’s
division of labour has proven to be very tenacious. It has continued to
inform subsequent attempts to bring IL and IR into contact again. A pop-
ular identification of the parameters of interdisciplinary cooperation sees
it as a research agenda based on two fundamentally different ‘optics’ to
studying international society – ‘instrumentalist’ versus ‘rule governed’ –
within IR and IL, respectively.4
2 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
3 Hans J.Morgenthau,Politics amongNations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd edn (New
York: Knoff, 1966), 13.
4 Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Relations and International Law: Two Optics’ (1997) 38
Harvard International Law Journal 487–502. See also Jeffrey L. Dunoff andMark A. Pollack
(eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The
State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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Such a strict juxtaposition between strategy and rules, however, turns
a blind eye to the dynamics that form the starting point of our current
analysis: that the expansion and transformation of international law may
enable states to recoup sovereignmanoeuvrability. Not by rejecting or dis-
regarding international law, but through active and strategic engagement
with the structures and substance of international law. The basic observa-
tion that, in contemporary international society, politics is concernedwith
international law just as much as international law must be understood in
relation to the society it seeks to regulate (rather than as a self-contained
normative order) is hardly new. As highlighted by Judge Alvarez in the
1949 Corfu Channel case:
Jurists, imbued with traditional law, have regarded international law as
being of a strictly juridical character; they only consider what they describe
as pure law, to the entire exclusion of politics as something alien to law. But
pure law does not exist: law is the result of social life and evolves with it;
in other words, it is, to a large extent, the effect of politics – especially of
a collective kind – as practised by the States. We must therefore beware of
considering law and politics as mutually antagonistic.5
Judge Alvarez essentially points to the need to move beyond a concep-
tualization of politics and law as mutually exclusive optics and instead
appreciate how international law and politics constantly inform and trans-
form each other.6 Several scholars have followed this lead, eager to push
on from Morgenthau’s legacy. Distinctly different approaches to analyz-
ing the relationship between politics and law in the international realm
have thus emerged:7 within IL, for instance, the New Haven school,8
5 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. People’s
Republic of Albania), judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Rep, Individual Opinion Judge Alvarez,
pp. 41–2.
6 Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule
of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Nikolas M. Rajkovic, Tanja E. Aal-
berts and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds), The Power of Legality: Practices of Interna-
tional Law and Their Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
7 For an (interdisciplinary) overview of different approaches, see Robert J. Beck, Anthony
Clark Arend and Robert D. Vander Lugt (eds), International Rules: Approaches from Inter-
national Law and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Michael
Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Robert J. Beck, ‘International
Law and International Relations Scholarship’, in David Armstrong (ed.), Routledge Hand-
book of International Law (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009).
8 See e.g. Myres S.McDougal, Studies inWorld Public Order (NewHaven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1960).
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international legal process scholarship9 and critical legal studies;10 and
within IR, for example, the English school,11 regime theory,12 the ‘legal-
ization debate’13 and different branches of constructivism.14 In addition,
specific research agendas have emerged seeking to theorize the politics of
international law.15 While this diverse theoretical landscape within both
disciplines carries many important insights, as reflected throughout the
different chapters of this volume, it has also created somewhat of a turf war
between different theoretical approaches and disciplines.16 This in turn
has hampered (inter)disciplinary dialogue and risks producing theory-
promoting or theory-testing rather than problem-driven research.
To avoid this pitfall, the present chapter thus proposes a different
avenue. In line with the above, the practices described in this volume
may be seen to represent a particular kind of ‘sovereignty game’, where
states respond to the developing rules and jurisprudence of international
law. As a heuristic device, the sovereignty game metaphor serves to bring
9 See e.g. Harold H. Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law’ (1996) 106 Yale Law
journal 2599–659.
10 See e.g. Nigel Purvis, ‘Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law’ (1991) 32Harvard
International Law Journal 80–127.
11 See e.g. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd edn
(London: Macmillan, 1995 [1977]).
12 See e.g. Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1983).
13 See e.g. Judith Goldstein et al., ‘Introduction: Legalization and World Politics’ (2000) 54
International Organization 385–99.
14 See e.g. Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism: Ele-
ments of an Interactional Theory of International Law’ (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law 19–74; Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Con-
ditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
15 Key contributions to the development of the ‘politics of law’ agenda are Martti Kosken-
niemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’ (1990) 1 European Journal of International Law
4–33; Christian Reus-Smit (ed.), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law – 20 Years
Later’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 7–19.
16 In some cases this has led to outright rejections of interdisciplinary approaches altogether:
Jan Klabbers, ‘The Bridge Crack’d: A Critical Look at Interdisciplinary Relations’ (2009)
23 International Relations 119–25; Jan Klabbers, ‘Counterdisciplinarity’ (2010) 4 Inter-
national Political Sociology; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Law, Teleology and International Rela-
tions: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity’ (2012) 26 International Relations 3–34. See also
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, ‘From Interdisicplinarity to Counterdisciplinarity: Is There Madness in
Martti’s Method?’ (2013) 27 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 309–37;
Tanja Aalberts, ‘IR and the Challenges of Interdisciplinarity’, in Andreas Gofas, Inanna
Hamati-Ataya and Nicholas Onuf (eds), The Sage Handbook of the History, Philosophy and
Sociology of International Relations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2018).
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attention to the interrelationship between players, rules and strategy.
Employing this metaphor, the present chapter thus seeks to unpack the
fundamental paradox of this volume: how the changing landscape of inter-
national law enables states to maximize their room for manoeuvre within
the legal field, and both reclaim or disclaim sovereign authority. More
specifically, the sovereignty game is a useful heuristic to explore the inter-
relationship between strategy and rules and move beyond their juxtapo-
sition as different optics.
As is elaborated below, the notion of ‘(sovereignty) games’ has further
been employed by a range of different theoretical perspectives. Rather
than staking out a particular position within this field or trying to resolve
the different controversies among different theoretical approaches, the
present chapter seeks to maintain a pluralist stance that – while obviously
drawing on different scholarship within both IL and IR – does not self-
identify with any specific positionwithin the current field of IL-IR studies.
Such a pluralist approach not only fits the empirical and problem-driven
starting point of this volume as well as the diverse theoretical orientations
of its contributors but also, we hope, opens up a space for fruitful academic
exchange across theoretical perspectives in light of recent developments in
international law.
2.2 Sovereignty Games
The notion of sovereignty games is a popular metaphor through which
to analyze world politics.17 As heuristic tools, metaphors help us to dis-
til the key traits of a concept or activity and are particularly helpful when
it comes to an elusive concept like sovereignty.18 Interestingly, the game
metaphor has been adopted by very distinct approaches, illuminating dif-
ferent aspects of the relationship between law and politics, as we dis-
cuss below. At a more general level, a focus on sovereignty games, or
17 For analytical usages of the metaphor, see Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty,
International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990); Georg Sørensen, Changes in Statehood: The Transformation of International Rela-
tions (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2001); Tanja E. Aalberts, ‘The Sovereignty Game States
Play: (Quasi-)States in the International Order’ (2004) 17 International Journal for the
Semiotics of Law 245–57; Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds),
Sovereignty Games: Instrumentalising State Sovereignty in Europe and Beyond (Houndmills,
UK: Palgrave, 2008); Tanja E. Aalberts, ‘Playing the Game of Sovereign States: Charles
Manning’s Constructivism Avant-La-Lettre’ (2010) 16 European Journal of International
Relations 247–68.
18 See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (eds), Metaphors We Live By, 2nd edn (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2003).
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sovereignty as a game, is a useful metaphor by drawing our attention to
three necessary elements of any game: players, rules and moves.19
First, who are the players involved? Who are the subjects of the
sovereignty game? From a legal perspective, this seems a rather straight-
forward question, as within international law only states have a sovereign
status, even if other subjects have gained some form of international legal
personality. In practice, however, we witness other actors taking over
sovereign prerogatives. This includes most palpably the European Union
but also less obvious candidates like private security agencies, foreign
investors and airflight carriers, who are now exercising powers that used
to be firmly and exclusively in state hands.20 Moreover, there has been
increasing attention for the disaggregation of sovereignty, and the need to
move beyond the focus on the state as a single actor, to the various gov-
ernment agencies that act in its name.21
The prism of this volume remains with states as the key players of the
sovereignty game, but with a specific focus on how processes of legal-
ization have changed the sovereign playing field as well as the state as
actor and what it can do. This relates to the second element of the game
metaphor: its characteristic as an activity defined by rules. Crucially, these
rules do not merely regulate moves in the game but also constitute the
game at a more fundamental level.22 Without rules, there is no game. In
terms of the sovereignty game, it is the rules of non-use of force and non-
intervention (Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter) that are usually
highlighted as the defining rules for the international society of sovereign
states. But as already suggested by Friedmann, and elaborated below, these
negative duties of co-existence have expanded intomore positive and sub-
stantive duties. Rather than identifying this as the beginning of the end of
sovereignty, the game metaphor directs us to a more nuanced position,
distinguishing between the status as a sovereign player and the changing
content of what it means to be a member of international society, based
on the fundamental rules and principles that govern that society and the
interaction between its members.23 This in turn relates to making moves
19 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘An Introduction to Sovereignty
Games’, in Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen, Sovereignty Games, pp. 1–17.
20 See Chapters 4, 6, and 8, this volume.
21 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2004); see also Chapter 6, this volume, which contrasts Anne-Marie Slaughter’s positive
presentation of disaggregated sovereignty with its dark sides.
22 John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995).
23 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Future of Statehood’, 32 Harvard International Law Journal
(1991), 397–410.Wouter G.Werner, ‘State Sovereignty and International Legal Discourse’,
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in a game, as the third component of the game metaphor. The possible
moves are defined by the rules of the game. This category also includes
(but is not limited to) strategic play. Strategy can be defined as the skilled
use of rules for specific purposes.24
This general heuristic of the sovereignty game, calling attention to play-
ers, rules and moves and strategies, enables us to move beyond the jux-
taposition of law and politics and instead examine them as interwoven
practices. Before we do so, the next section engages with different ways in
which the game metaphor has been applied in analyses of world politics
and international law, as the background theoretical discussion for our
more specific analytical focus on sovereignty games to analyse the chang-
ing practices of international law.
2.3 Metaphors of Games
Casual references to the metaphor aside, the game metaphor is rooted
in two different traditions within international studies and legal theory:
rationalist game theory, which has inspired contemporary legal research
through, notably, the work of Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner,25 on the
one hand, and the Wittgensteinian notion of language games, which has
inspired critical approaches in both IL and IR (notably through the work
of Martti Koskenniemi and Friedrich Kratochwil, respectively),26 on the
other.27 As is elaborated below, these traditions highlight different aspects
of the politicization and instrumentalization of law that are the focus of
this volume.
in Ige F. Dekker and Wouter G Werner (ed) Governance and International Legal Theory
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 125–157. See also Abram Chayes and Antonia Han-
dler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
24 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Adler-Nissen, Introduction.
25 Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2005).
26 The classical works are Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of
International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 [1989]), and
Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1991); see also Anthony Carty, ‘Language Games of International Law: Kosken-
niemi as the Discipline’s Wittgenstein’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law
1–20. The game metaphor has recently been used in a volume on interpretation in inter-
national law: Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor (eds), Interpretation in
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
27 See Tanja E. Aalberts, Constructing Sovereignty between Politics and Law (London: Rout-
ledge, 2012), Chapter 5, for a more elaborate discussion of these different traditions.
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Probably the most well-known application of the game metaphor is so-
called rational choice game theory. Originating in Economics, game the-
ory has gained popularity within Political Science. The focus here is on
different strategies that actors may pursue and different game scenarios,
such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken Game and Battle of the Sexes.
The imaginative starting point is that of states playing a game, adopting
different strategic behaviour, occasional cheating practices and free inter-
pretation or breaking of the rules in order to win the game or protect one’s
interests as best possible. With the emergence of Law and Economics as a
separate field, as well as the interdisciplinary agenda with IR, this mode of
analysis has also found its way into IL, notably through the work of Jack
Goldsmith and Eric Posner.28 In the elaboration of Goldsmith and Pos-
ner, economic models help to determine the power of law by measuring
compliance based on state behaviour driven by state interests.
According to this approach, states only complywith international law to
the extent that rules alignwith their political interests.29 In their influential
volume, Goldsmith and Posner argue that international law lacks (causal)
force or effectiveness because it has no independent moral force. Interna-
tional law is thus epiphenomenal to power politics. Indeed, international
law itself is the product of state interests: ‘international law emerges from
states acting rationally tomaximize their interests, given their perceptions
of the interests of other states and the distribution of power’.30 Accord-
ingly, a game theoretical approach to international law addresses the poli-
tics of international law by focusing on the ‘why’ question: why, and under
what circumstance, do states comply with international law?31 Located
within rational choice thinking, the focus is usually on (given) material
interests of states, although particular strands of constructivist research
28 Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of
International Law; Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice
Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). To be sure, law and economics is a
broader school, and not all approaches are similarly focused on realist premises about indi-
vidual state interest but rather foreground economic utility as a systemic or collective good
and telos of international law. Goldsmith and Posner’s volume, however, has gained most
traction in the interdisciplinary debate with International Relations, precisely because of
their affinity with realism.
29 StephenD.Krasner, Sovereignty: OrganizedHypocrisy (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1999).
30 Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, p. 3.
31 Critics conversely argue that such a framework has a built-in assumption of interest-driven
behaviour (whatever a state does, it proveswhat state interest are as only interests drive state
behaviour). Moreover, it assumes that rules speak for themselves. See e.g. Koskenniemi,
‘Law, Teleology and International Relations’; Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions.
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have broadened the agenda to also include the social context in which
norms and interests operate.32 In such a view, statesmay change their con-
ception of their interests owing to, for instance, processes of socialization
between members of international society.
A rather different approach to games emerges from critical approaches
within both IL and IR, inspired by philosophy of language.33 These schol-
ars suggest that we should not only broaden our focus to look at different
mechanisms for compliance, but ask how it is possible for states to com-
ply with international law and what compliance means in the first place.
For Koskenniemi, a crucial question for understanding the operation of
international law is to ask ‘what there is to comply with in the first place,
what, of the many possibilities, is the preferable meaning of the rule, and
should the rule be applied, or the exception?’34 Such a perspective draws
attention to the important role of contestation as part of increasing legal-
ization and that such contestation as well as seemingly aberrant behaviour
may serve a productive role vis-à-vis the validity and moral force of
international law.35 For instance, non-compliant behaviour may be jus-
tified by reference to rules themselves – e.g. by appealing to exceptional
circumstances, hence confirming that in normal situations the rules do
indeed apply.
The emphasis on justification and on viewing international law as
an argumentative practice are characteristic of another application of
the game metaphor,36 drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
32 E.g. Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty; James Fearon and AlexanderWendt, ‘Ratio-
nalismv.Constructivism:A Skeptical View’, inWalterCarlsnaes, ThomasRisse andBethA.
Simmons (eds),Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002), 52–72; Martha
Finnemore and Stephen J. Toope, ‘Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of Law and
Politics’ (2001) 55 InternationalOrganization 743–58, at 745. This rationalist-constructivist
debate or even synthesis has been an important driver of themainstream IL/IR agenda. See
Dunoff and Pollack, Interdisciplinary Perspectives.
33 See e.g. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions; Kratochwil, Status of Law; Koskenniemi,
From Apology to Utopia.
34 Koskenniemi, ‘Law, Teleology and International Relations’, p. 17, italics ommitted; Kra-
tochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions; Kratochwil, Status of Law.
35 Kratochwil, Status of Law.
36 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, and Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions. Gold-
smith and Posner discuss the communicative utility of law, whose formal and abstract
language enables states to explain their policies and clarify their interests to an audience
that does not share the same community (The Limits of International Law, pp. 182–84). As
elaborated by linguistic approaches, language has a more constitutive function than being
merely a communicative device.
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language.37 Wittgenstein compares language to making moves in a game
to explicate that language is itself a form of action, a form of life, governed
by rules.38 In other words, he uses the game metaphor to illuminate the
productivity of language, i.e. the role of language in constructing reality.
Whereas this was an important and controversial insight for IR theory and
its ‘linguistic turn’,39 the power of language is commonknowledge for both
legal scholars and practising lawyers. Language and words, such as ‘war’
or ‘genocide’, produce distinct legal categories and effects. By labelling par-
ticular actions as (part of) an armed conflict, we enter into a different
legal game, with specific rules of legal and illegal conduct.40 In Wittgen-
steinian terms, the language and categories of international law are a form
of action, they do something to reality. Moreover, like a language game,
practices of international law are based on rules and conventions, which
on the one hand describe possible moves and prohibit others, and on the
other hand are flexible in that they do not dictate which specific course of
action is taken.
Another element follows from this. To identify language as action
means that words are not self-contained, but gain their meaning in prac-
tice: ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’.41 As H. L. A. Hart
argues, rules do not speak for themselves, but can only be interpreted and
applied in relation to concrete cases, and the open texture of general terms
in language render international rules and obligations indeterminate.42 In
contrast to a positivist conception, critical approaches within both IL and
37 Ludwig J. J. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn (London: Prentice Hall,
1958). Both Koskenniemi and Kratochwil rely onWittgensteinian philosophy of language.
See also Carty, ‘Language Games of International Law’.
38 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 7.
39 This linguistic turn was instigated in IR by Nicholas G. Onuf,World of Our Making: Rules
and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Car-
olina Press, 1989); Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions; and a special issue in (1990) 34
International Studies Quarterly 259–416.
40 Tanja E. Aalberts and Wouter G. Werner, ‘International Law and International Political
Sociology’, in Xavier Guillaume and Pınar Bilgin (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Inter-
national Political Sociology (New York: Routledge, 2017), 40–41. See also David Kennedy,
Of War and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
41 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 43, see also paras 23, 83.
42 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 121–44. In his later
writings, Hart distances himself from this linguistic argumentation of indeterminacy and
suggests that ‘a legal system often has other resources besides the words used in the formu-
lations of its rules which serve to determine their content or meaning in particular cases’
(Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993],
pp. 7–8).
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IR similarly reject the existence of a rule outside or beyond its interpreta-
tion. In other words, interpretation creates meaning, rather than discov-
ers it.43 If law is a linguistic activity and argumentative practice, the lan-
guage game metaphor highlights that the meaning of international law –
and hence international law itself – is produced through its usage. This
becomes even more complex when the legal landscape is composed of a
patchwork of overlapping regimes and transnational networks, operating
in deformalized, highly pluralistic contexts where ‘international norms
[are] enforced through decentralized processes [by the] “international
community”’,44 as the background of this volume’s analysis.
A further point follows from this, namely that legal arguments are
always made from particular subject positions with various interests and
preferences at play.45 Recall again Madeleine Albright’s request for new
lawyers in the Kosovo war.46 This opens up a whole different venue to
analyze the ‘politics of international law’. As one of its significant contri-
butions to international legal theory, critical legal studies lays bare how
the inherent indeterminacy of the law gives a prominent place to political
choices that not only drive legal practice, but constitute itsmeaning.47 This
also means that the juxtaposition of rules versus strategy is too crude to
capture the interplay between politics and law. The success story of inter-
national law and the legalization of world politics does not rule out strate-
gic engagement – states not only playing by but also with the rules and
their international normative commitments.48 However, as mentioned in
43 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 531. See also Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation
Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative Twists (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013). This also means that the distinction between rule creation and
rule application collapses. In addition, in From Apology, Koskenniemi further elaborates
the power of discourse and the structure of legal argumentation in terms of a specific
post-structuralist tradition of deconstruction. In Derridian fashion, he deconstructs the
structure of legal argumentation as a system of conceptual differentiations that manifestly
produces internal contradictions (see also Chapter 3, this volume). Koskenniemi, how-
ever, distances himself from the idea of radical indeterminacy based on semantic openness
(Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 595). See also Iain Scobbie, ‘Towards the Elim-
ination of International Law: Some Radical Scepticism about Sceptical Radicalism’ (1991)
61 British Yearbook of International Law 339–62.
44 Kennedy, Of War and Law, p. 91. See also Rajkovic et al., Power of Legality.
45 See e.g. Chapters 3, 4 and 8, this volume. This focus on (state) preferences and interests
is akin to rational choice theorists, even if the conceptualization of what these interests
are differs. See Alexander Wendt, A Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 113–38.
46 Chapter 1, this volume. 47 See Chapter 3, this volume.
48 In this context, critical legal studies identifies law as an instrument of hegemony and power.
Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ (2004) 17
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197–218; Eyal Benvenisti andGeorgeW.Downs,
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Chapter 1, identifying the role of strategy is not the same as reducing inter-
national law to a tool for power politics and introducing realism through
the backdoor. Indeed, the language gamemetaphor draws attention to the
fact that ‘rationality’ involves a (dynamic) interpretation of one’s situation,
the normative context (what game are we playing, which rules apply?),
and one’s identity (what is my position within this game, what role do I
play?).49 In other (more abstract) words, actors, actions and objects obtain
their meaning and identity in the context of a set of rules and practices
that defines their interrelationships. The linguistic turn hence highlights
the productive function of language by focusing on what it does – how
interpretations shape (our knowledge of) the world, and how they render
particular actions possible, obvious or legitimate, but also leave room for
contestation of rules, their interpretation and applicability.
Together, this means that the usual juxtaposition of politics and law
as a zero-sum game is too simplistic to capture the role of international
law, its simultaneous expansion and contestation within contemporary
global governance. Analyzing these dynamics requires a move beyond the
focus on law as (not) constraining the behaviour of key actors, to analyz-
ing its role as facilitating, enabling and disciplining politics.50 Moreover,
the (sovereignty) game metaphor invokes the idea of law as a practice,
‘an activity, whose “being” is in the “doing” of the participants within the
practice’ (rather than a ‘thing’ as a given and self-evident body of rules),
as will be elaborated in the next section.51 This includes, but is not limited
to argumentative practices or legal discourse. The current volume ana-
lyzes politico-legal practicesmore broadly, to identify specific strategies of
political contestation through international law, to carve out the space of
sovereignty politics in relation to the changing parameters of international
law. Based on their different theoretical affiliations, the various chapters
will provide different answers as to why and how states are doing this.
2.4 The Game of Sovereigns and International Law
Bringing these insights to bear on our discussion on changing practices
of international law, we suggest that the notion of sovereignty games is a
‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International
Law’ (2007) 60 Stanford Law Review 595–631.
49 See also Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions; Kratochwil, Status of Law.
50 Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’, in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected
Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977 (Brighton, UK: Harvester Press, 1980), 109–33.
51 Dennis M. Patterson, ‘Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice and Narrative’, in Dennis M.
Patterson (ed.),Wittgenstein and Legal Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 87.
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helpful tool to analyze the relationship between sovereignty, politics and
law as mutually constitutive practices of international society. Building on
our initial identification of the different elements of the sovereignty game,
it highlights that sovereignty is not just about winning a game, and pursu-
ing foreign policy goals and state interests, but also how to play, identifying
which manoeuvres are possible or prohibited, and who gets to play, in the
first place (i.e.moves, rules andplayers). In otherwords, apart from instru-
mental rules and tactics (i.e. the instructions given by a coach), games
also entail constitutive rules which define which game we are playing,
and who are the designated players (rules of recognition) and what moves
can be made by different pieces/actors.52 This also means that world pol-
itics can only be understood by taking the normative framework within
which sovereign actors emerge and act into account.53 Even if sovereignty
is commonly identified with autonomy and freedom, this independence
is not separate from the development of an international legal order, but
produced in tandem. Not only is sovereign statehood inherently linked to
changing membership rules of international society, its features of inde-
pendence, autonomy and freedom are also themselves products of inter-
national law; they are a condition of specific political communities accord-
ing to international law, to paraphrase Judge Anzilotti in the Customs
Union case.54 In other words, in international legal discourse, sovereignty
is used to identify the legal status of a political community as an indepen-
dent state.
In terms of our game metaphor, this also means that the role of
international law within the sovereignty game entails more than just
the regulation of international affairs between pre-existing state enti-
ties; it constitutes the very players of the game in the first place
by legitimating their participation and empowering their international
capacity, and by defining the parameters within which they can exer-
cise their independence and sovereignty. These parameters include,
but are not limited to, the basic rules of conduct for international
52 Jackson, Quasi-States, pp. 34–5.
53 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Introduction’, in Christian Reus-Smit (ed.), The Politics of Interna-
tional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 3.
54 Separate Opinion of Judge Anzilotti to the Austro-German Customs Union Case (Austria
v. Germany), Advisory Opinion, Permanent Court of Justice, PCIJ Series A/B, no. 41, 1931
(emphasis added). See also Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), Permanent
Court of Arbitration, 2 RIAA 829, 1928, p. 838.
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intercourse, which entails both their freedom and rights, and their duties
and obligations.55 In other words, sovereignty can be conceived of as
a specific way of ordering international life by linking freedom and
responsibility.56
At the same time, the rules of the game are not carved in stone:
the meaning of sovereignty, its legal scope and content, are produced
in practice, i.e. in their usage. As pointed out by the Permanent Court
in the Nationality Decrees case: ‘The question whether a certain mat-
ter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essen-
tially relative question; it depends upon the development of interna-
tional relations’.57 The development of international law means that such
sovereign obligations or responsibilities have significantly expanded to
include international obligations towards the state’s own citizens, humans
everywhere (as claimed by e.g. the Responsibility to Protect paradigm)
and even towards non-personal entities such as the environment.58 It is
through the conceptual shift from sovereignty as autonomy and freedom
to sovereignty as responsibility that we can understand state strategies
that sometimes involve attempts to eschew their sovereign prerogatives,
shift sovereign responsibility elsewhere or recoup sovereign freedom by
engaging with the rules. This in turn means that the paradoxical out-
come of the success of international law (in terms of its multiplica-
tion and expansion) can be law’s complicity in organizing and creating
irresponsibility.59
55 ‘This right [to exercise sovereignty and the functions of a State] has as corollary a duty: the
obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other States, in particular their right
to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war, together with the rights which each State
may claim for its nations in foreign territory’. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United
States), Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2 RIAA 829, 1928, p. 839.
56 Tanja E. Aalberts and Wouter G. Werner, ‘Sovereignty beyond Borders: Sovereignty,
Self-Defense and the Disciplining of States’, in Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen,
Sovereignty Games, pp. 129–50.
57 Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco (Britain v. France), PCIJ, Series B, no. 4, 1923,
p. 24. For a historical analysis, see Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State:
Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
58 Tanja E. Aalberts and Wouter G. Werner, ‘Mastering the Globe: Law, Sovereignty and the
Commons of Mankind’, in Rens van Munster and Casper Sylvest (eds), Assembling the
Planet: Post-War Politics of Globality (New York: Routledge, 2016).
59 Scott Veitch, Law and Irresponsibility: On the Legitimation of Human Suffering (Abingdon,
UK: Routledge, 2007). See also discussion in Chapter 3, this volume.
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But the ‘meaning in use’ also plays at the level of interpretative strug-
gles about the application of international law. This struggle does not
take place in normative isolation, but among players that need to defend
and justify their positions, whether during judicial proceedings before a
court60 or as part of everyday political practice, both within national par-
liaments and international diplomatic fora. Like any game, playing by the
rules does not rule out strategizing.61 As mentioned above, importantly,
this focus onmeaning-in-use and strategy should not be seen to introduce
radical indeterminacy or instrumentalization-all-the-way-down through
the back door. In fact, what counts as a strategic move is to a great extent
determined (although not dictated) by the rules of the game. What is a
strategic move depends on which game is being played and from which
position. There is no rule in soccer that forbids a goalkeeper frommoving
at the frontlines; nevertheless, given the aim and rules of the game, s/he
would be a fool to do so under normal circumstances. In Chapter 4, Lang-
ford et al. in this context distinguish between strategies that states engage
with as the principal of international investment regimes and their tactics
as litigant in front of an arbitration body.
Moreover, as a practice, strategizing in regard to policies and interpre-
tation has to take account of the wider field of possible interpretations
of a given issue. Consequently, by entering into the juridical field, gov-
ernments have to accept ‘the specific requirements of the juridical con-
struction of the issue’.62 Yet within this framework it is entirely possible
to affect both the legal interpretation and framing of a particular issue as
well as to organize political practices so as to avoid liability. Here too, strat-
egy as such is not opposite to rule-play, but indeed dependent on knowl-
edge of the rules (know-what) as well as the skills for engaging in legal
argumentation (know-how). In Chapter 6, Mann refers to legal practice
as lawyerly craft, to encompass both the element of skilled use, the art or
professional practice of doing law, and the element of cunning and strate-
gizing. Government legal advisors become the crucial intermediaries in
this interplay between politics and international law – at once decipher-
ing the boundaries of legitimate political action and actively engaging in
60 See Chapters 4 and 5, this volume.
61 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 85.
62 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ (1987) 38
Hastings Law Journal 805–53, at 831.
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devising creative solutions to ensure that these boundaries are not static
but negotiable.
2.5 The Legal Room for Manoeuvre
The overall argument of this volume is that the expansion of interna-
tional law into a complex web of overlapping legal regimes provides
further leverage for playing the sovereignty game, regaining sovereign
power while at the same time disclaiming sovereign responsibility.
As Baumgärtel shows in Chapter 5, this ‘legislative patchwork’ can be
used creatively not only prior to legal procedures (in the case of judi-
cial forum shopping), but also during court proceedings, as well as in
post-judgment positioning. Moreover, as the chapters in this volume
collectively show, the combined quantitative and qualitative transfor-
mation of international law – from positivist rules to a wider variety
of legal instruments, including soft law such as codes of conduct and
Memoranda of Understanding – further facilitate strategic engagement,
or navigating the room for semi-compliance, as Langford et al. formu-
late it with regard to international investment regimes in Chapter 4.
The varied patchwork of legal regimes, institutions and instruments
enables the invocation of one register of international law against another,
not to disregard or violate legal norms, but to avoid it by ‘comply[ing]
with other law – while at the same time thwarting law’s stated norma-
tive commitments’.63 The result, as Brummer provocatively suggests in
Chapter 3, is law’s complicity in organizing and creating irresponsibil-
ity. Together the case studies show how the expansion of international
law has not eliminated politics, but transformed its operation as states
are now pursuing their foreign policy goals through a variety of legal-
ized strategies that mobilize international law in sophisticated ways in
order to mitigate its constraining effects while legitimizing international
politics.
Thus, we have moved from the identification of rules and strategy
as two separate optics on the workings of international politics and
law,64 to their workings as intertwined aspects of international law as an
argumentative practice in international society. And crucially, as this vol-
ume shows, the politics of international law works both ways.65 The
63 Chapter 6, this volume, p. 131. 64 Keohane, ‘Two Optics’.
65 Reus-Smit, ‘The Politics of International Law’, p. 14.
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recent discussion on lawfare is only the most outspoken illustration of
how law has become an integrated part of world politics, a sine qua
non for doing and justifying foreign policies and politics.66 Indeed, in
Chapter 5, Baumgärtel suggests that finding ways to manage the courts
has now become part of the game of policy making. The case studies in
this volume demonstrate that despite their desire to ensure greater polit-
ical manoeuvrability in regard to international law, states nonetheless go
to great lengths to find solutions that maintain a certain degree of legal
legitimacy.
A key question in examining the current range of practices in regard to
international law is thus what makes certain policy options appear unvi-
able from the perspective of governments? The very resort to ‘exceptional-
ism’ and creative policymeasures suggest that at least under some circum-
stances international law sets certain boundaries that states accept as being
beyond dispute. Indeed, as aforementioned, calling upon an exception
reinforces the discursive power of international law as the framework and
vocabulary for international intercourse. At other occasions, states can try
andpush the legal boundaries through creative legal argumentation – such
as the revival or corpus theory developed by the US allies to try and jus-
tify the Iraq intervention by relying on the body of resolutions issued by
the UN Security Council in the 1990s, or the infamous torture memos
by the Bush administration. Rather than calling upon the exception as a
way to suspend international law in the face of vital threats to global secu-
rity, these are practices of legal representation, trying to embed security
practices within the law.67 The shift to risk management, and the trans-
ferral of the ‘precautionary principle’ from international environmental
law to the field of security in the war on terror, further stretches the
legal register, as does the international law’s move towardsmanagerialism,
incorporating non-legal experts’ vocabulary of ‘reasonableness’, ‘ethics’, or
‘efficiency’ as part of legal reasoning.68 As Ellis argues in Chapter 7, this
is at least partly the effect of making the crafting and application of its
66 Kennedy, Of War and Law; Wouter G. Werner, ‘The Curious Career of Lawfare’ (2010) 43
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 61–72.
67 Fleur Johns, Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2013). See also Chapter 3 (on the legal creation of extraterritorial zones) and
Chapter 6 (on the legal design of global mass surveillance), this volume.
68 Kennedy, Of War and Law; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law:
Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 1–30. See also the
symposium on ‘The Risks of International Law’ (2008) Leiden Journal of International Law
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specialized norms heavily dependent upon scientific expertise, or what in
our typology is referred to as ‘extralegal deferral’.69
2.6 Conclusion
Rather than assuming that power politics always trumps international
law, or vice versa, assuming that the expansion of international law con-
strains and disciplines the operation of sovereign power unidirectionally,
this chapter argues that we need to understand how international law,
sovereignty and the operation of power are intimately intertwined and
that, accordingly, we need to engage in empirical investigations of how
players, notably states, proceed when they encounter the expansion of
international law into diverse areas and different modalities, how states
put the rules to practices and relate them to their actions.70 In this chapter,
the sovereignty game serves as a heuristic starting point for more gener-
ally examining how the expansion of international law goes hand in hand
with changing state practices and increasing – rather than diminishing –
politico-legal manoeuvrability.
The gamemetaphor also highlights that sovereignty cannot be reduced
to freedom and autonomy, rights and duties alone, as it is about status
(being a player in the game) as much as it is about competences. From the
above discussion, it is clear that we see neither sovereignty nor interna-
tional law as something given. This includes not only the volume’s focus
on the quantitative and qualitative transformations of international law,
but also a move beyond international law as only a body of rules, to a
focus on how these rules come to life through sovereign practices (and
vice versa). As outlined in the preceding chapter, different developments of
international lawhave indeed changed the playing field formembers of the
international society, leading many states to engage more profoundly and
creatively with this normative corpus in order to retain or recoup room
21(4), 783–884. Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty proposes a managerial approach
to increase state compliance with international law.
69 See also the symposium on ‘Expertise, Uncertainty, and International Law’ in (2013)
Leiden Journal of International Law 26(4), 783–854, and Wouter G. Werner, ‘The
Politics of Expertise: Applying Paradoxes of Scientific Expertise to International
Law’, in Monika Ambrus et al. (eds), The Role of Experts in International and
European Decision-Making Processes. Advisors, Decision Makers or Irrelevant Actors?
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 44–62.
70 Kratochwil, Status of Law, p. 54.
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for sovereign manoeuvre. The following chapters analyze these politico-
legal practices in the field of human rights litigation, international invest-
ment regimes, environmental law, global mass surveillance, irregular boat
migration and extra-territorial detention.
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